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Abstract
To raise revenue in a progressive, effi  cient, and administrable manner, 
this chapter proposes a new national consumption tax: a broad-based 
credit-invoice value-added tax (VAT). Th e proposal comes with several 
qualifi cations: the VAT should complement, not substitute for, new direct 
taxes on the wealth or income of affl  uent households; to ensure the policy 
change is progressive, the VAT should be coupled with adjustments to 
government means-tested programs to account for price level changes, and 
with a universal basic income (UBI) program; to avoid having the VAT 
depress the economy, revenues should be used to raise aggregate demand 
in the short run and the Federal Reserve should accommodate the tax by 
allowing prices to rise. A 10 percent federal VAT that funded a UBI equal 
to 20 percent of the federal poverty line would be highly progressive (with 
net income rising among the bottom forty percent and not changing in 
the middle quintile) and would still raise more than 1 percent of GDP in 
net revenue. VATs are a proven success, existing in 168 countries. VATs 
have been proposed by both Democrats and Republicans in recent years. 
Concerns about small businesses, vulnerable populations, and the states 
can be easily addressed. 
Introduction 
Th e future fi scal and economic health of the United States depends on its 
ability to increase revenues.1 With high and rising public debt, an aging 
population that will place increasing demands on federal spending, and a 
need for new investments in infrastructure, research and development, and 
human capital, the federal government requires more funding to improve 
its fi nances and promote future economic growth and opportunity. Recent 
fi scal actions that raised current and future budget defi cits, including the 
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Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2018 and 
2019, make these matters worse. 
One way to collect more revenue is to reform existing taxes. Instead, or in 
addition, policymakers could create new revenue sources. 
Th is chapter proposes a new progressive, national consumption tax: a 
broad-based, credit-invoice value-added tax (VAT), sometimes referred to 
as a “goods and services” tax. Th e most intuitive way to understand the 
VAT is that it is like a retail sales tax, but with tax revenue that is collected 
in parts at each stage of production rather than all at once at the retail level.2 
Similar to a tax imposed in New Zealand, this VAT would tax a broad base 
that includes items that other countries’ taxes typically omit: education, 
health care, fi nancial services, and nonprofi ts. To maintain parity with the 
private sector, federal, state, and local government spending would be taxed 
too, but this taxation of government spending would not raise net revenues, 
because the federal government cannot raise net revenue by taxing itself 
and because the proposal would reimburse subnational governments for 
the VAT they pay. Coupled with a universal basic income that varies with 
family size and composition, the VAT can raise substantial amounts of 
revenue in a progressive fashion. 
Th e proposal comes with fi ve important provisions and considerations. 
First, the VAT proposed here is intended to work in conjunction with other, 
highly progressive policies, like an ongoing direct wealth tax, capital gains 
reforms, or other policy changes that raise taxes on well-to-do households. 
As noted throughout this volume, there are important reasons to raise tax 
burdens on high-income and high-wealth households relative to others, 
so this proposal should be read as a complement to—not a substitute 
for—other ways to raise taxes on the rich.3 Th is is because taxes on high-
income and high-wealth households, by themselves, are not likely to raise 
suffi  cient revenue to allow the federal government to control debt, invest in 
the economy, and provide payments to the elderly (Gale 2019). In addition, 
pairing a VAT with these policies is likely to make them more eff ective. 
One of the easiest ways for higher-income households to avoid wealth 
taxes or income taxes is to consume more—an avenue that a VAT makes 
less attractive. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in light of secular 
increases in income and wealth inequality, it is inappropriate to ask the 
middle class to pay the higher taxes a VAT entails without also enacting 
substantially higher levies on high-income and high-wealth households.
Second, to ensure that the VAT is on balance a progressive reform, it 
should be coupled with several policies that relieve the burdens on low- and 
middle-income households. Means-tested government transfers should 
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be adjusted for any increase in the price level (including the VAT) so that 
the real aft er-tax value of these benefi ts remains unchanged. In addition, 
Congress should stipulate a one-time change in how Social Security benefi ts 
are calculated to counteract what would otherwise be an aft er-tax benefi t 
reduction imposed on new generations of benefi ciaries by the VAT. A VAT 
with these two adjustments is progressive—it reduces aft er-tax income of 
lower-income households by a smaller proportion than it does for higher-
income households. Th e reason is that protected forms of income—Social 
Security and means-tested transfers—constitute a much larger share of 
income for lower-income groups. 
Th is policy package can be made even more progressive by using a 
portion of VAT revenues to provide each household with a universal basic 
income (UBI) based on family size and composition. Th is benefi t would 
be provided through quarterly payments to each family, for an annual 
reimbursement equal to two times the poverty line times the consumption 
tax rate. For example, with a 10 percent VAT, a family of four would receive 
about $5,200 back each year, compensating them for taxes paid on about 
$52,000 of consumption.4 Families that spend less than two times the 
poverty line would receive more from the UBI than they would pay in VAT. 
Families with higher spending would only face a net tax burden when they 
consume above two times the poverty line. Including the UBI, the VAT is 
remarkably progressive by conventional standards: aft er-tax income would 
rise by almost 17 percent in the lowest income quintile, remain virtually 
unchanged in the middle quintile, and fall by 5.5 percent among the top 1 
percent of households. 
Th ird, to avoid the VAT depressing the economy in the short run, most or 
all of the revenues collected in the years immediately following enactment 
should be spent on programs that stimulate the economy. For example, 
revenue from a VAT (aft er the adjustments described above) could be used 
to expand the UBI, restructure or reduce other taxes, pay for health care 
(Burman 2009), fund work incentives (Burman 2019), boost necessary 
government investments, or provide temporary stimulus, all of which 
would help off set any demand reduction from the introduction of the VAT. 
Over time, some of those uses could be scaled back so that revenues from 
the VAT could be used to reduce the federal debt.
Fourth, in the enabling legislation, Congress should direct the Federal 
Reserve to accommodate the VAT by allowing the nominal price level to 
rise by the full extent of the tax. If the price level rises by less than this 
amount, some of the adjustment to a VAT would take place through 
declines in nominal wages, which could be a costly and lengthy process. 
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Fift h, while I am not wedded to a particular tax rate, I use a 10 percent 
federal VAT in the analysis below. If states converted their existing retail 
sales taxes to conform with a federal VAT base, they would need to set a 
VAT rate of 6.6 percent, on average, to raise current levels of revenue in 
a manner that is more generous to the bottom 40 percent of the income 
distribution than current sales taxes. Th e average combined federal-state 
VAT, 16.6 percent, would be signifi cantly below the 2018 OECD average 
VAT rate of 19.3 percent. 
Taking these fi ve considerations into account, the broad-based credit-
invoice VAT this chapter proposes would bring to the United States a 
progressive and growth-friendly version of the revenue source that so 
many other nations rely upon. America has never had a national broad-
based consumption tax of any kind, but the VAT is the world’s most 
common consumption tax, used by more than 160 countries, including 
every economically advanced nation except the United States. In 2016, 
consumption taxes raised just 3.7 percent of GDP in the United States, 
mainly through state and local sales taxes, compared with 10.5 percent in 
other OECD countries, mostly through VATs.5 
VATs are popular for many reasons. First, and most importantly, VATs raise 
a lot of money. Asked why he robbed banks, Willie Sutton supposedly said, 
“Because that’s where the money is” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2015). 
As a tax on a broad measure of consumption, VATs are “where the money is” 
in tax reform. In other OECD countries, VATs are the third largest revenue 
source, behind social security and personal income taxes.6 A VAT initiated 
in 2020 at a 10 percent rate would raise $247 billion, or 1.1 percent of GDP, 
even aft er funding a UBI that provides families payments equal to the VAT 
rate times twice the poverty line. Over the course of 2020–29, the policy 
would raise $2.9 trillion. If a UBI were not implemented, the VAT would 
raise revenue by a whopping $842 billion in 2020, or about 3.8 percent of 
GDP.7 Th e 10-year total is about $10 trillion. Th e revenue generated by a 
VAT would provide an enormous pool of resources to address social and 
economic problems. 
Second, VATs are consistent with an effi  cient and prosperous economy. 
Future consumption is funded by existing wealth, future wages, or future 
excess returns on investments. As a result, a consumption tax eff ectively 
imposes a one-time implicit lump-sum tax on a broad measure of wealth 
existing at the time of implementation. Th e burden of this component of 
the VAT is imposed immediately upon enactment because the value of 
wealth changes. Th is outcome is easiest to see if the consumer price level, 
which includes the VAT, rises by the full VAT rate. In that case, existing 
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assets can then be exchanged for less aft er-tax consumption than before the 
VAT was imposed.8
Th e burden a VAT places on existing wealth avoids three key pitfalls of a 
direct wealth tax: Th e VAT’s wealth tax is extremely effi  cient because it 
is very diffi  cult to avoid or evade; it does not require explicit valuation of 
particular assets; and it taxes excess returns, which is not distortionary, 
rather than taxing all returns, which is. But while this wealth tax is 
progressive by conventional standards, because the distribution of wealth is 
skewed toward the top, the burden imposed by the VAT is substantially less 
progressive than that of a direct wealth tax with a high exemption. While 
the burden of a VAT on existing wealth is imposed immediately upon 
enactment through a decline in the purchasing power of existing assets, 
the explicit tax payments arising from future consumption of existing 
wealth accrue only over potentially long periods. Still, the present value of 
long-term revenue from the burden a VAT imposes on wealth is at least 
equal to—and may well exceed, under plausible assumptions—the 10-
year (undiscounted) revenue yield of the wealth tax proposed by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren. 
A VAT also has important effi  ciency advantages over other types of taxes. 
Because VATs do not distort saving, investment, or fi nancial decisions, they 
are more conducive to economic growth than income taxes or wealth taxes 
are. Because of the unique crediting structure that they employ, VATs are 
easier to administer and enforce than retail sales taxes. And by using border 
adjustments that remove taxes on exports but impose taxes on imports, 
VATs are consistent with other countries’ tax systems and avoid creating 
distortions in international trade.
Critics argue that a VAT could hurt small businesses, low-income 
households, the elderly, and state and local governments. Th ese concerns 
are either overblown or easily addressed:
• Th e United States should exempt small businesses from the tax as most 
countries do; the administrative burdens of taxing small businesses 
under a VAT may not be worth the revenue gains. 
• Concerns about low-income and elderly households should be 
addressed by the UBI and by the adjustments to Social Security benefi t 
calculations and means-tested transfers described above. 
• No state would have to convert its sales tax to a VAT, but states that 
convert to a base that conforms with a federal VAT could more 
eff ectively tax services and interstate consumer purchases and avoid 
taxing business purchases, all with reduced administrative costs. 
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Critics also assert that a VAT would increase government revenues and thus 
inappropriately raise government spending. Yet in European countries, 
VATs did not boost government spending much, even when long-term debt 
was not an issue. Instead, the vast share of VAT revenue went to reducing 
outdated or poorly working sales and turnover taxes (the latter defi ned as 
taxes on transactions of intermediate goods rather than on value added). 
Th e United States is most likely to adopt a VAT in the context of a long-
term debt reduction agreement that would presumably also impose limits 
on spending. 
Fears about the United States adopting a VAT can be further assuaged by 
looking at Canada’s experience. Th e Canadian VAT has features to provide 
progressivity, and it has not swelled the government. Some of the provinces 
have kept their previous sales taxes, and some have conformed their 
provincial tax base with the federal VAT; all of the provinces retain the 
power to set their own rates. 
So why don’t we already have a VAT? More than 30 years ago Larry Summers 
summarized the VAT’s political prospects by saying that “liberals think it’s 
regressive and conservatives think it’s a money machine,” predicting that 
policymakers will enact a VAT only when liberals realize that it is a money 
machine and conservatives realize that it is regressive (Rosen 1988).9 Th ere 
is no better description of the political problem. 
But Summers’ statement also holds the key to reaching a political accord. 
Although liberals fear it would be regressive, a VAT can be part of a 
progressive strategy. For example, European countries impose VATs but 
also spend more generously than the United States on social policy priorities 
like universal health care, paid family leave, assistance for low-income 
households, and investments in children. And though conservatives fear 
it’s a money machine, the VAT is effi  cient and can be part of a compromise 
with liberals that limits spending and highlights the need to pay for any 
new spending increases (as in Gale 2019). 
In recent years the VAT has received support from a variety of quarters. 
More than 20 years ago, leading legal scholar Michael Graetz proposed a 
VAT as part of a broader restructuring of the tax system, a proposal recently 
endorsed by Benjamin Cardin, the Democratic senator from Maryland 
(Graetz 1997, 2008, 2013; Cardin 2015). Numerous Republican political 
leaders—including Paul Ryan, Rand Paul, and Ted Cruz—have proposed 
that the United States adopt a VAT (though they do not call it that) as a 
way of reforming taxes (Ryan 2008; Paul 2015; Cruz Campaign 2015). Th e 
Domenici-Rivlin commission proposed a VAT (called a “debt reduction 
sales tax”) for the purpose of paying down the federal debt (Debt Reduction 
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Task Force 2010). Th e key point is that—regardless of how political leaders 
would like to use the revenue—there is widespread agreement on the value 
of the VAT: it raises revenue in an effi  cient, equitable, and administrable 
manner that is consistent with an open economy. As noted, I do not specify 
the use of VAT revenues, but to make sure the VAT does not restrict 
aggregate demand in the short run, a sensible approach would use the 
revenues to fund economic stimulus, government investment or tax reform, 
and would only phase in federal debt reduction over longer horizons. 
To motivate and justify the proposal for a VAT, the chapter proceeds as 
follows. Th e fi rst section discusses the overall fi scal challenge facing the 
country and why a VAT would be a constructive part of the solution. 
Th e second section provides background information on the history and 
workings of the VAT. Th e third section outlines a proposed VAT for the 
United States. Th e fourth section provides an economic evaluation of the 
VAT, elaborating on its properties as a tax on wealth and discussing its 
eff ects on revenue, growth, distribution, and tax administration. Th e fi ft h 
section addresses questions and concerns, including the money machine 
argument, the impact of a VAT on the states, the politics of a U.S. VAT, and 
the Canadian experience. 
The Challenge 
Th e justifi cation for a credit-invoice VAT is threefold: (a) the government 
needs to raise revenues as part of the response to the long-term fi scal 
outlook, (b) consumption taxes contain attractive features as sources of 
additional revenue, and (c) the credit-invoice VAT is advantageous relative 
to alternative consumption taxes. 
REVENUES AND THE LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK 
Under the most recent Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO 2019) projections, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio will rise steadily from 79 percent today—already 
the highest in U.S. history except for a few years around World War II—
to about 143 percent in 2049, assuming that current laws remain in place 
(which also imply tax increases that are likely to be politically unrealistic 
and constrained spending growth). In a more realistic scenario that follows 
current policy, the debt will rise to 177 percent over that same period 
(Auerbach, Gale, and Krupkin 2019).10 At that time, net interest payments, 
which peaked at 3.2 percent of GDP in 1991, would be 4.6 percent and 
5.6 percent of GDP, respectively, under the two scenarios. Under either 
scenario, debt and interest payments will continue to rise relative to GDP 
aft er 2049. Th ese trends occur even though the projections assume that 
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over the next 30 years the economy will remain close to full employment 
and government interest rates will remain far below the output growth 
rate. Rising debt will make it harder to grow the economy, boost living 
standards, deal with national security challenges, respond to recessions, 
address social needs, and maintain the country’s status as a global leader. 
As a matter of accounting, debt is projected to rise because spending will 
increase faster than revenues. But this does not make rising debt a “spending 
problem” that must be addressed solely by spending cuts, for two reasons. 
First, much of the projected increase in spending as a share of the economy 
is due to rising net interest payments—burdens created by defi cits from 
previous years. Th ese burdens are not obviously better borne by spending 
cuts than by revenue increases. Second, the rest of the spending increase 
is due to an aging population and rising health-care costs, which will 
place more demands on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Neither 
source of higher spending is the result of new government programs; 
rising spending is simply policymakers’ earlier commitments coming due, 
commitments that, to date, they have chosen not to fund with suffi  cient tax 
revenues.
In short, the debt problem is not either a spending problem or a tax 
problem any more than one side of the scissors does the cutting. Rather, 
the problem is the imbalance between spending and revenues. Addressing 
the debt challenge will require both slowing the spending trajectory and 
raising taxes. 
CONSUMPTION TAXES 
Consumption taxes in general—and VATs in particular—can, if properly 
designed, provide an impressive combination of substantial revenue, 
progressivity, and effi  ciency. Policymakers and researchers oft en consider 
the tax system’s revenue potential separately from its effi  ciency or 
progressivity. Th e issues, however, are closely related. If the overall revenue 
from the tax system needs to rise, it becomes even more important that the 
new taxes be effi  cient and progressive. 
Th e VAT can raise substantial amounts of revenue. Among OECD member 
countries in 2016, VATs were the third largest source of revenue behind the 
individual income tax and social security contributions and raised about 7 
percent of GDP on average. 
Consumption taxes are effi  cient, relative to other taxes. As discussed later in 
this chapter, introducing a consumption tax imposes an implicit lump-sum 
tax on wealth that existed before the introduction of the tax. Th is implicit 
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tax on existing wealth tax does not distort behavior, cannot be avoided 
or evaded, raises substantial revenue over time, and does not require that 
value be assessed (Altig et al. 2001; Auerbach and Kotlikoff  1987). Unlike 
income taxes, consumption taxes do not distort the return on new saving 
or investment: they do not aff ect the decision to consume today or save for 
the future. Th ey also do not distort choices related to organizational form, 
debt or equity fi nancing, or dividend payments. However, like income 
taxes, consumption taxes do encourage leisure (which is untaxed) at the 
expense of labor. 
Consumption taxes can be part of a progressive reform package, depending 
on the rate structure of the tax and the presence of off setting policies like 
the UBI proposed here or cuts to regressive payroll taxes. 
THE CREDIT-INVOICE VAT RELATIVE TO OTHER 
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Consumption taxes come in many forms (see the appendix). Some are 
explicitly transaction-based (e.g., the credit-invoice VAT and the retail 
sales tax). Some are essentially personal consumption taxes—income taxes 
with an exemption for net saving, such as the USA tax proposed in the 
1990s by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Pete Domenici (R-NM)—that 
rely on the fact that all aft er-tax income is either consumed or saved. Some 
are streamlined business income taxes (e.g., a subtraction-method VAT). 
Others are a combination of cash-fl ow business taxes and personal taxes on 
wages (e.g., the “fl at tax” and the X-tax, described in the appendix). 
Th is chapter focuses on a credit-invoice VAT, which off ers signifi cant 
administrative and compliance advantages over other transaction-based 
taxes (such as the retail sales tax, as discussed further below). 
Th e credit-invoice VAT would also work well as a supplement to the 
existing tax system, whereas personal consumption taxes, streamlined 
business income taxes, and cash-fl ow business taxes are usually proposed 
as replacements for existing personal and corporate income taxes. In 
addition, the credit-invoice VAT is a proven revenue mechanism used in 
167 countries worldwide. Only Japan uses a system similar to a subtraction-
method VAT, and no country uses a large-scale retail sales tax, a fl at tax, an 
X-tax, or a tax similar to the USA tax. 
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VAT Basics 
A business’s “value added” is the diff erence between its gross sales and its 
purchases of goods and services from other businesses. It is equal to total 
worker compensation plus cash fl ow. 
Suppose a farmer grows wheat and sells it to a baker for $40. Th e baker turns 
the wheat into bread and sells it to consumers for $100. Th e baker’s value 
added is $60—the diff erence between sales and purchases. For simplicity, 
we will assume that the farmer has no input costs, so the farmer’s value 
added is $40. Th e total of the values added at each stage of production is 
equal to the retail sale price of the good, in this case $100.
Governments can tax value added in diff erent ways. (See box 1 for a brief 
history of VATs). In the credit-invoice method, each business pays the 
government the VAT collected on its sales minus a credit for the VAT it 
pays on its input purchases (see table 1). If the VAT were 10 percent in the 
previous example,11 the farmer would charge the baker $44 overall, pay $4 
in VAT to the government, and keep $40, which is equal to the farmer’s 
value added.12 Th e baker would charge consumers $110, pay $6 in VAT (the 
diff erence between the $10 the baker owes on sales and the $4 credit paid to 
TABLE 1. 
Taxes, Sales, and Value Added Under Alternative Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value 
added
Tax 
collected 
on sales
Total 
sales 
(including 
tax)
Tax 
credits
Net tax 
payments
(2) − (4)
Net receipts
No 
taxes
Farmer 40 0 40 0 0 40
Baker 60 0 100 0 0
60 
(i.e., 100 − 40)
Retail 
sales 
tax
Farmer 40 0 40 0 0 40
Baker 60 10 110 0 10
60 
(i.e., 110 − 40 
− 10)
Credit-
invoice 
VAT
Farmer 40 4 44 0 4
40 
(i.e., 44 − 4)
Baker 60 10 110 4 6
60 
(i.e., 110 − 44 − 
10 + 4)
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BOX 1. 
History of Value-Added Taxes 
Th e VAT is a relatively new tax. While tariff s, excise taxes on 
alcohol, and other taxes have existed for centuries, the VAT was 
designed in the early 20th century and began to be implemented 
on a wide scale only about 50 years ago. Wilhelm von Siemens, a 
German businessman, designed the VAT to resolve problems that 
arose in implementing sales taxes. Independently and roughly 
contemporaneously, Th omas S. Adams, an American, conceived 
of the VAT as a better version of the corporate income tax. In 
practice, in economically advanced countries, VATs have been 
introduced largely as improved versions of consumption taxes, 
replacing excise, turnover, and retail sales taxes, rather than as 
replacements for the corporate income tax. Almost all advanced 
countries maintain separate corporate income taxes. 
Many European governments adopted VATs in the 1960s and 
1970s, motivated by European Economic Community (EEC) 
directives requiring a harmonized VAT as a condition for entry 
into the European Union. Several Latin American governments 
also implemented VATs over this period. Starting in the late 1980s, 
several economically advanced non-EEC countries, including 
New Zealand (1986), Japan (1989), Canada (1991), South Africa 
(1991), Singapore (1994), Switzerland (1995), and Australia (2000), 
implemented VATs, as did many countries with developing 
economies.
Th e VAT now exists in a vast majority of countries and in 2016 
accounted for more than 20 percent of OECD tax revenue. Th e 
diff usion of the VAT was “the most signifi cant development in the 
fi eld of taxation in the past 50 years,” according to Sijbren Cnossen, 
a leading tax expert from Maastricht University in the Netherlands 
(Cnossen 2011, 34).
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the farmer), and keep $60 ($110 minus $44 minus $6), which is equal to the 
baker’s value added. Consumers pay $110 for the bread, and the government 
receives $10 in taxes.
Consumer payments, tax revenues, and aft er-tax revenues received by each 
producer are the same under a 10 percent VAT as under a well-functioning 
10 percent retail sales tax (table 1). 
 The Proposal: Designing an American VAT 
An American VAT would retain the signal advantages of the tax—revenue 
potential, effi  ciency, and administrability—and add progressivity to that 
list of qualities. Th e core elements of an American VAT would be as follows:
• a broad base, including essentially all consumption that is associated 
with explicit payments; 
• a base that includes all government wages and purchases, with state 
and local government VAT payments rebated to them by the federal 
government; 
• a standard rate that applies to all taxable purchases; 
• an exemption for businesses with gross annual revenue below $200,000, 
although they would be allowed to opt in;
• adjustments to preserve the real value of federal means-tested transfers 
and Social Security benefi ts; and 
• a UBI based on household size and composition. 
BASE 
Th e VAT should rest on the broadest consumption base possible. Focusing 
on consumption avoids distorting choices regarding saving, investment, 
organizational form, fi nancing, and dividend payouts. It also avoids having 
business taxes “cascade” with each stage of production, which would have 
the undesirable feature of more heavily taxing goods with more stages of 
production. 
Setting the base as broadly as possible has numerous attractive features. 
It reduces opportunities for tax avoidance and limits distortions in 
production and consumption. It reduces wasteful administrative eff orts 
to defi ne which products are taxable—for example, whether a Halloween 
costume is clothing (which might be exempt) or a toy (which might not be 
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exempt). It reduces the need and expense for fi rms to allocate their costs 
between sales that are and are not subject to VAT. It also reduces political 
pressure to generate ever more exemptions. 
Nevertheless, almost all VATs exclude some goods or services, doing so in 
one of two ways: zero rating and exemption. When a retail good (food, for 
example) is zero rated, the seller does not have to pay taxes on the retail sale 
but still receives credits for the VAT paid on input purchases. Th is reduces 
the fi nal sale price of the good compared with what it would have been if 
the item were taxed at the standard rate. A business that is exempt does not 
pay tax on its sales, but in contrast to zero rating, it does not receive credits 
for the VAT it paid on inputs. Th is breaks the VAT’s chain of credits and 
can end up raising prices, depending on how much of the value added was 
provided by input suppliers. 
Countries tend to zero rate particular goods with the intent of enhancing 
progressivity and tend to exempt goods that are hard to tax. VATs 
in the European Union typically exclude hospital and medical care, 
noncommercial activities of nonprofi ts, sporting services, cultural services 
(except radio and television), residential rents, fi nancial services, supply of 
land and buildings, and other items. As a result, European VATs tax less 
than 60 percent of overall consumption (OECD 2018). Th ey also do not 
tax government purchases. In contrast, newer (second-generation) VATs—
such as in Australia and New Zealand—tend to tax a broader base. In New 
Zealand, for example, the base includes essentially all consumption and 
government spending. 
Taxing Consumption 
As noted, the VAT should apply to as much consumption as possible. 
Applying the VAT to food consumed at home is particularly important. 
Food accounts for a large share of overall spending and, of course, a 
larger share of the budget of low-income households than of high-income 
households (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2019). Still, taxing food makes 
sense for several reasons. First, from an administrative perspective, zero 
rating food consumed at home leads to diffi  cult line-drawing situations. 
Table 2 provides examples from the United Kingdom’s VAT. Second, from 
an equity perspective, taxing food and providing universal payments based 
on household size and composition is more progressive than zero rating 
food, because food expenditures rise in absolute terms as income rises, 
even though they decline as a share of spending (Benge, Pallot, and Slack 
2013). Th ird, from a political perspective, if the tax applies to a necessity 
like food, policymakers will be hard-pressed to make a case for giving other 
goods preferential treatment. 
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Education expenses, to which the proposed VAT would apply, are another 
thorny issue. Th e case for excluding education is that it is an investment 
and so could plausibly be excluded from a VAT. On the other hand, not all 
education expenditures are themselves investments (Gong et al. 2019). Zero 
rating education expenses would create inevitable line-drawing problems, 
especially since the VAT does not necessarily give preferential treatment 
to other consumption that supports human capital—for example, buying 
a book or an educational toy for a child. In addition, higher-income 
households consume a disproportionately large share of education, so zero 
rating its associated expenses would be regressive.13 Other policies already 
subsidize education, so making these policies more generous (with revenues 
from a VAT), in ways that are targeted to social objectives, would be a better 
way of supporting human capital investments than excluding education 
from a VAT. Th e VAT should apply to the net price of education, not the 
sticker price. In many cases students receive considerable discounts in the 
form of fi nancial aid and grants from universities. Taxing the sticker price 
would ignore the heavy eff ective price discounts many students receive. 
Similar to the treatment of nonprofi ts in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand, the activities of nonprofi t organizations would be 
subject to the VAT. Although these organizations are exempt from income 
taxation in those countries and in the United States, that exemption in 
itself is not justifi cation for exemption from a VAT (Gendron 2011; Morris 
TABLE 2. 
United Kingdom VAT Treatment of Food
Food item Zero rated Full VAT
Cakes/cookies All cakes and some cookies Cookies covered in chocolate
Chips Vegetable-based Potato-based
Chocolate For cooking and baking For direct consumption
Dog food For working dogs For pets
Drinks Alcoholic bitters Alcoholic beverages
Frozen treats Frozen yogurt, frozen cakes Ice cream, ice cream cakes
Fruit Dried fruits for cooking and baking Dried fruits for snacking
Herbs For culinary use For medical use
Hot food Made on site Reheated or kept warm
Nuts Raw, in the shell Roasted, shell removed
Peanuts Raw, shell removed Roasted, shell removed
Source: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. Internal Manual, VAT Food 2018.
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2011). Preferential status under a VAT would generate a strong incentive 
for individuals to shift  their consumption to nonprofi ts, creating more 
regulatory and line-drawing diffi  culties. 
Most VATs exempt some or all fi nancial services. Many fi nancial services 
are provided without explicit fees (e.g., checking account services oft en are 
paid for through lower interest rates on the accounts), making it diffi  cult 
to calculate value added. Exemption of fi nancial services, however, creates 
the usual line-drawing problems and makes it diffi  cult for fi rms to allocate 
costs between exempt and nonexempt transactions. In addition, it overtaxes 
business-to-business transactions, since it breaks the VAT crediting chain, 
and it undertaxes business-to-consumer transactions because it imposes no 
tax on the value added for the consumer (Merrill 2011). To the extent that 
the creation of fi nancial services uses real resources, those services should 
be taxed under a VAT, just like any other activity (Auerbach and Gordon 
2002). And, for political reasons, if the VAT applies to food, it needs to 
apply to fi nancial services. New approaches and technology have made it 
more straightforward to tax fi nancial services, so these methods should be 
used to assess VAT in the United States.14
Several countries, including South Africa and Australia, already tax a 
signifi cant share of fi nancial transactions through a VAT. Alternatively, 
many countries use a fi nancial transactions tax—which, as a tax on gross 
turnover, is conceptually diff erent from a VAT—as is proposed by Weiss 
and Kawano (2020) in this volume and discussed by Burman et al. (2016). 
Because a VAT is collected when consumption transactions occur, it cannot 
easily be applied to consumption that occurs without explicit payments. For 
example, people who own their home do not pay themselves explicit rent. 
As a result, most VATs do not tax the implicit rent that owner-occupiers pay 
themselves. Instead, for administrative reasons, VATs typically adopt the 
prepayment approach: the VAT is applied to the purchases of new owner-
occupied housing (which occurs when the house is sold from a business to 
a household, but not when a household sells a house to another household). 
Any improvements to owner-occupied housing should also be subject to 
a VAT. To avoid distorting households’ choice to be an owner-occupier 
versus a renter, the VAT should exempt rental payments as well, and instead 
charge VAT on the purchases of new housing meant for rental use as well as 
improvements to rental housing. As discussed later, use of the prepayment 
method means that when a VAT is imposed, the existing housing stock is 
excluded from the tax. 
Th e same logic applies to the existing stock of nonhousing durables—cars, 
boats, furniture, collectibles, and so on. Th e benefi ts derived from durables 
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that already exist would not be taxed under the VAT, but purchases of new 
assets would be taxed. 
Taxing Government 
To maintain price parity with the private sector, the VAT would tax federal 
purchases of goods and services and employee compensation. Th is avoids 
creating the (incorrect) appearance that the federal government can 
make purchases more cheaply than the private sector. However, taxation 
of federal purchases would not raise any net revenue, since it would raise 
federal spending by the exact amount that it raises revenues (Gale 2005). 
Th e VAT would tax state and local government purchases of goods and 
services and employee compensation, again to maintain parity with the 
private sector. But because the federal VAT should not burden people in 
their role as state and local taxpayers, it should include a rebate for VAT 
paid by state and local governments. As a result, taxing state and local 
governments’ purchases and employee compensation would not raise any 
net revenue.15 Th e VAT would also exempt state and local sales taxes, to 
avoid cascading. 
Border Tax Adjustments 
Th e tax should be administered on a destination basis, as is standard 
practice in the rest of the world. Th at is, it should tax imports and zero 
rate exports. Th ese border tax adjustments (BTAs) allow the VAT to operate 
across countries in a harmonized manner. Contrary to popular belief, 
BTAs do not subsidize exports (Slemrod 2011). Instead, they allow VATs to 
function as consumption taxes rather than production taxes. Th ey impose 
the same tax on all goods consumed in the host country and exclude all 
goods not consumed in the host country, regardless of where the goods 
are produced. Figure 1 shows that BTAs convert what would be a tax on 
domestic production to a tax on domestic consumption. With no BTA, the 
VAT would tax all goods produced domestically, as shown in the fi rst row 
of the fi gure. Th e BTA eliminates the tax on exports and adds a tax on 
imports. Th is results in the VAT taxing all goods consumed domestically, 
as shown in the fi rst column. 
 Recent policy discussions about replacing the corporate income tax with 
a destination-based cash-fl ow tax (which is shown in the appendix to be 
simply a subtraction-method VAT that also allows deductions for wages) 
created controversy. One issue was whether the nominal exchange rate 
would adjust fully. However, if the Federal Reserve fully accommodates 
a VAT by allowing prices to rise, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate 
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remains unchanged, leaving cross-border transactions unaff ected. A 
second concern was that exporters would receive large net subsidies under 
the destination-based cash-fl ow tax. In contrast, under the VAT, exporters 
would not be able to deduct wages, so virtually all exporters would have 
positive value added and be liable for tax.16 
Small Businesses 
Most countries exempt some small businesses from value-added taxation 
but allow them to register if they choose to (Gale, Gelfond, and Krupkin 
2016). Th is is partly because small-business owners form a powerful 
political constituency and partly because the administrative costs of taxing 
small businesses are high relative to the revenue they generate. Although 
the defi nition varies, a small business is usually defi ned by gross revenues 
below a certain level, ranging from close to zero to almost $120,000 among 
OECD countries in 2018. 
Because the optimal exemption threshold trades off  administrative costs 
and revenue earned, the higher the VAT rate, the lower the exemption 
threshold should be (Keen and Mintz 2004). Th e logic supporting this 
conclusion is that the expected VAT revenue rises as the tax rate rises, 
while compliance costs for businesses stay constant as the rate rises. For 
example, Brashares et al. (2014) estimate that the optimal threshold would 
be $200,000 under a 10 percent VAT and would fall to $90,000 under a 20 
percent VAT. Th at exemption would be higher than in most other countries, 
but the 10 percent rate would be lower than in most other countries.
FIGURE 1. 
Border Tax Adjustments Convert a Production Tax to a 
Consumption Tax
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Exemption is a mixed blessing. It reduces fi rms’ compliance costs and taxes 
owed on sales but eliminates their ability to claim the VAT they pay on 
input purchases (and receive accompanying rebates from the government). 
An exemption may also reduce the demand for a business’s product if it 
sells to other businesses, since other companies prefer to buy their inputs 
from fi rms that are in the VAT system so that they can claim credits for the 
taxes they pay. Evidence suggests that small-business exemptions lead to 
segmentation of the economy, with VAT-eligible fi rms tending to conduct 
business only with other eligible fi rms and ineligible fi rms working with 
other ineligible fi rms (Gadenne, Nandi, and Rathelot 2019; De Paula 
and Scheinkman 2010). Finally, an exemption may create increased tax 
avoidance opportunities. Nevertheless, a 10 percent VAT should provide 
an exemption for companies with gross revenue under $200,000 and allow 
them to opt in if they wish. Estimates indicate that this exemption level 
would save 43 million businesses from having to fi le VAT if they chose not 
to (Brashares et al. 2014).
THE STANDARD RATE 
Th e VAT should have a single standard rate that applies to all purchases 
under the VAT. European countries oft en have a variety of preferential 
rates, a practice that experts have described as “increasingly quaint” 
(Crawford, Keen, and Smith 2010). Standard VAT rates vary substantially 
across countries. In the 35 OECD member countries apart from the United 
States, the average standard rate in 2018 was 19.3 percent but varied 
widely—from 5 percent in Canada (not counting provincial VATs) to 27 
percent in Hungary. 
Having a standard rate on all goods and services has several advantages. 
Taxing diff erent goods at diff erent rates creates opportunities for 
avoidance, raises administrative costs, and would create an endless stream 
of arguments in favor of subsidizing additional goods. In contrast, taxing 
everything at the same rate may miss some opportunities to moderately 
improve the effi  ciency of the tax code under ideal circumstances, but it will 
prove fairer and simpler and will reduce avoidance.17
SUBSIDIES TO PROTECT THE VALUE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
AND MEANS-TESTED TRANSFERS 
Th e VAT will drive a wedge between wages and prices equal to the size of 
the tax. Either nominal wages will fall, prices will rise, or some combination 
of the two will occur. Either way, real wages will fall. (As discussed further 
below, the preferred outcome would be for the Federal Reserve Board to 
accommodate the VAT and allow prices to rise by the full extent of the tax 
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so that nominal wages would not have to fall, thus avoiding the wrenching 
macroeconomic consequences of declining nominal wages). 
Higher VAT-inclusive prices will reduce the value of means-tested federal 
benefi ts. To avoid this unintended reduction in benefi ts, Congress should 
stipulate that those benefi ts would be adjusted upward to maintain their 
real purchasing power. 
Th e drop in real wages (i.e., the fact that consumer prices inclusive of the 
VAT will rise relative to wages) will also have unintended consequences 
for Social Security. Each birth-year cohort’s real Social Security benefi ts 
are proportional to the real value of the National Average Wage Index in 
the year that the cohort turns 60. Th us, without further adjustments, the 
proposed VAT would cut real benefi ts for cohorts younger than age 60 at the 
time the tax was implemented. To maintain real benefi ts, Congress should 
require the Social Security Administration to make a one-time adjustment 
to the National Average Wage Index to off set the reduction caused by the 
VAT (Carroll and Viard 2012). 
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 
Almost all countries implement progressive adjustments by providing 
product-specifi c subsidies (e.g., by zero rating food or utilities).18 Since 
these items represent a greater share of the budget for low-income families 
than for high-income families, zero rating these goods makes the tax more 
progressive than it otherwise would be. Th e eff ect on progressivity, though, 
is weaker than it could be, because high-income families spend more in 
absolute terms on these items than low-income families do. 
A per-person or per-family allowance more eff ectively targets the funds 
toward low-income households. In the proposal, each family would receive 
a UBI, paid quarterly and equal to the VAT rate multiplied by twice the 
poverty line. A family that consumed less than twice the poverty line would 
thus receive a net benefi t under this proposal. A family that consumed at 
twice the poverty line would pay no net tax once the VAT and UBI are taken 
into account. Families with higher income would face net tax burdens, but 
only in proportion to the amount of their consumption above the poverty 
line. Th e UBI would vary by family size (as does the poverty line) and be 
about $5,200 for a family of four. Th e average UBI across all households 
would be just over $3,400 per year.
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THE NET TAX BASE
Table 3 shows the calculation of the VAT eff ective tax base.19 Starting from 
aggregate consumption expenditures, the base is adjusted to refl ect the 
prepayment status of housing. No adjustment is needed to accommodate 
the prepayment status of durables or collectibles because aggregate 
consumption expenditures already include new purchases of those items 
and exclude benefi ts (i.e., “consumption services”) that fl ow from those 
existing assets. Th e eff ective tax base—the base available to generate net 
VAT revenue—is reduced by excluding government spending on health 
care (which is part of consumption), given that the federal government 
cannot raise money by taxing itself. Further adjustments are made for state 
and local sales taxes on fi nal consumption, the small business exemption, 
avoidance, evasion, and miscellaneous factors. Th is leaves an aggregate 
eff ective tax base of $9.8 trillion, which equals about 64 percent of aggregate 
consumption or 44 percent of GDP. 
TABLE 3. 
Broad VAT Base in 2020
 
Level
 (billions of $)
Percent of 
consumption
Percent 
of GDP
Consumption 15,374.0 100.0 68.9
Less: Government health expenditures 1,795.0 11.7 8.0
Less: Net housing adjustment 1,610.4 10.5 7.2
Less: Imputed rent on owner occupied 
housing 1,809.5 11.8 8.1
Less: Rental of tenant-occupied 
housing 660.0 4.3 3.0
Plus: New housing purchases 579.5 3.8 2.6
Plus: Improvements of existing housing 279.6 1.8 1.3
Less: Other adjustmentsa 149.1 1.0 0.7
Equals: Consumption in VAT base 11,819.5 76.9 52.9
Less: State and local general sales taxes 
on ﬁ nal consumption 294.6 1.9 1.3
Less: Noncompliance/small business 
exemption 1,728.7 11.2 7.7
Equals: Effective broad VAT base 9,796.1 63.7 43.9
GDP 22,326.1 145.2 100.0
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019); Congressional Budget Ofﬁ ce (2019); and Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center estimates.
a Net purchases of used cars and net foreign travel and expenditures by U.S. residents abroad.
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Evaluating a VAT 
Th e VAT can raise signifi cant amounts of revenue in a manner that is 
progressive, administrable, and conducive to growth. 
BUDGETARY EFFECTS 
Table 4 shows that, with adjustments for Social Security and means-tested 
transfers, and with a UBI equal to the VAT rate times twice the poverty line, 
the VAT would raise $247 billion in 2020 or about 1.1 percent of GDP. Over 
the 2020–29 period the VAT would generate about $2.9 trillion in revenues. 
If the UBI were cut in half, the VAT would raise $545 billion in 2020 and 
$6.5 trillion by the end of 2029 (not shown). With no UBI, the VAT would 
still be progressive (because of the protection of real Social Security benefi ts 
and means-tested transfers, discussed below) and would raise $842 billion 
in revenue in 2020, rising to $10.0 trillion over the next decade.20 
THE WEALTH TAX COMPONENT OF A VAT
A consumption tax imposes a burden on wealth that exists at the time 
the tax is introduced. Households fi nance their consumption from one 
of three sources: existing wealth, future earnings, and returns on future 
TABLE 4. 
Effect of VAT on Federal Revenue, Spending, and Defi cit 
in 2020 with and without Universal Basic Income (UBI)
VAT (no UBI)
(billions of $)
VAT (with UBI)
(billions of $)
Gross VAT revenues 979.6 979.6
Less: Increase in federal cash transfer 
payments
137.2 137.2
Less: Rebate (rate × 2 × FPL) — 595.8
Net revenue, 2020 842.4 246.6
Net revenue, 2020–29 10,023.3 2,934.4
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0319-2) and Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center estimates.
Note: The proposal would introduce a VAT of 10 percent and provide a rebate in the form of a 
universal basic income for each household equal to 10 percent times twice the federal poverty 
level. The analysis shows the long-run impact on revenues and spending at 2020 levels of income 
and consumption. The analysis assumes that the Federal Reserve allows consumer prices to rise 
and that federal cash transfer beneﬁ ts are increased to maintain real purchasing power.
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investments.21 Th us, one component of a pure consumption tax is a tax on 
all pre-existing wealth, which will be liable for the tax whenever it is used 
for consumption. Crucially, the consumption tax is capitalized immediately 
into the value of assets, even if it is paid to the government over a potentially 
lengthy period. By lowering the aft er-tax income stream generated by an 
asset existing at the time the tax is introduced, the consumption tax causes 
an immediate reduction in its real price.22 
Th e easiest way to understand this eff ect is to assume that, aft er the 
implementation of a consumption tax, the price level rises by the full extent 
of the tax. Th en existing wealth is worth less; a decrease in wealth will 
translate into less consumption in the future. For example, if a 10 percent 
tax on all consumption raised the consumer price level by 10 percent, it 
would reduce the value of existing wealth by 9.09 percent (10 divided by 
110). (In contrast, if the price level remained constant, the entire burden 
would fall on equity holders and show up as a nominal decline in equity 
values; the value of nominally denominated debt would not change.) 
But, as noted, the proposed VAT would only tax consumption associated 
with explicit transactions. Under the proposed prepayment approach 
described above, a VAT would not tax the consumption services that 
households obtain from existing owner-occupied housing, rental housing, 
durable goods, or collectibles, though it would tax new purchases (and 
improvements) of these items. As a result, the VAT would impose an 
implicit one-time lump-sum tax, not on all pre-existing wealth, but rather 
on pre-existing wealth not held in housing, durables, or collectibles. 
Th is component of the VAT has enormously positive properties (see box 
2). A lump-sum tax on the relevant wealth raises signifi cant amounts of 
revenue. It is likely to create minimal distortions, avoidance, evasion, and 
deadweight loss. Because it is not imposed directly, it does not require 
assessments of the value of specifi c items of wealth. And it is extremely 
progressive, given the unequal distribution of existing wealth.23 
LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY AND GROWTH 
It is hard to think of a tax that could raise as much revenue as a VAT 
and have better effi  ciency eff ects, except perhaps for other forms of a 
consumption tax. Th e implicit lump-sum tax on pre-existing wealth (other 
than housing and durables) is one reason: a one-time tax on existing wealth 
can raise considerable revenue without economic distortions (Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff  1987).24 More generally, a VAT that is levied uniformly over time 
on all noninvestment goods and services has several key attributes. It does 
not distort relative prices or consumer choices among taxed goods, nor does 
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BOX 2. 
Comparing a VAT to a Direct Wealth Tax 
Th is chapter views the VAT as a complement, not a substitute, for 
direct taxes on the well-to-do, such as the wealth tax proposed 
by Warren (2019) or discussed in Saez and Zucman (2019a). 
Compared with these other taxes, the VAT has diff erent goals, 
diff erent effi  ciency properties, and diff erent distributional eff ects. 
Still, comparing the one-time wealth tax embodied in the VAT to 
an annual wealth tax on extremely wealthy households can help 
inform the debate. 
Th e VAT’s implicit wealth tax has several obvious diff erences 
from direct wealth taxes. First, the VAT does not require explicit 
valuation of assets. Second, the wealth tax imposed by the VAT 
is essentially a lump-sum tax and would be diffi  cult to avoid. 
Th ird, the VAT burdens future excess returns, whereas the direct 
wealth tax burdens the normal return in addition to excess returns 
(Guvenen et al. 2019). Fourth, the wealth tax imposed by the VAT 
would be quite progressive, imposing 21 percent of the burden on 
the top 0.1 percent of households, 70 percent on the top 5 percent, 
and 93 percent of the burden on the top quintile.25 But the wealth 
tax component of the VAT would still be far less progressive than 
a tax on individual wealth above $40.6 million, which would be 
paid only by households in the top 0.1 percent of the wealth 
distribution.26 
Th e revenue diff erences between the two taxes are also of interest. 
Th e lump-sum wealth tax component of the VAT would fall on all 
wealth other than existing owner-occupied housing, rental housing, 
durable goods, and collectibles. A lower bound of the value of such 
wealth can be obtained by summing the value of fi nancial assets 
and privately held businesses and subtracting associated debt—
about $70 trillion in 2019.27 Applying a 15 percent adjustment 
for evasion and avoidance (which is probably an overestimate, 
due to the diffi  culty of escaping a VAT), the base would be about 
$60 trillion. Since the VAT would apply to about 64 percent of 
consumption, the eff ective base would be about $38 trillion. Th e 
VAT would impose the wealth tax at the rate of consumption 
taxation (10 percent), generating about $3.8 trillion in revenue in 
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present value. Th is is almost exactly equal to the (undiscounted) 
10-year revenue gain, $3.75 trillion, reported by Senator Warren’s 
campaign for her wealth tax (Warren 2019), though estimates for 
this aspect of the VAT and the wealth tax are both uncertain.28 
Comparing the long-term revenue of a VAT and Senator Warren’s 
wealth tax is not simple. Th e burden on wealth from a VAT 
would be a one-time source of revenue but would be paid over a 
potentially extremely lengthy period. In contrast, estimates of the 
present value of the revenue from a wealth tax as described in Saez 
and Zucman (2019a, 2019b) or proposed by Warren (2019) could 
generate a wide range of values, depending on the assumed growth 
rate of the economy and the appropriate rate of discount. Th us, 
while the present value of the burden on wealth from the VAT is 
about 19 times the initial annual revenue collected from the wealth 
taxes described above, it is more diffi  cult to compare their long-
term relative revenue yields. 
it aff ect household saving choices or business investment, organizational, 
fi nancing, or payout choices. But as with income and payroll taxes, the VAT 
distorts household labor supply choices because it creates a wedge between 
what one earns and how much consumption one can aff ord. 
A VAT is designed to operate in an increasingly globalized world. Border 
adjustability is consistent with world trade agreements and other countries’ 
practices and would not disrupt the global supply chains that modern 
corporations rely on. Evidence suggests that the VAT does not reduce trade 
fl ows (Benartzi and Tazhitdinova 2018).
Th e eff ects of a VAT on long-term economic growth depend, of course, 
on how the revenues are used, and thus quantitative estimates are beyond 
the scope of this chapter. One use of revenues is to partially replace the 
income tax. A large literature has addressed this topic, showing positive but 
generally small long-run eff ects, especially once personal exemptions and 
transition relief are included (see Altig et al. 2001). Huntley, Prisinzano, 
and Ricco (2019) use the Penn Wharton Budget Model to estimate that 
a 1 percent VAT, on a base somewhat smaller than that proposed in this 
chapter, with a refundable tax credit that is substantially smaller than the 
UBI proposed here, and applied to defi cit reduction, would raise GDP by 
0.1 percent by 2030 and by 0.8 percent by 2050. More generally, higher tax 
revenues need not reduce growth: neither time series analysis nor cross-
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section samples suggest a strong association between tax revenue levels and 
growth rates.29 
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS 
Imposing a VAT would likely depress consumption, at least temporarily 
(Alm and El-Ganainy 2012; Carroll, Cline, and Neubig 2010). As noted, 
it may therefore be appropriate, in the short run, to use VAT revenues 
to fund programs that generate demand in the economy to the greatest 
extent through stimulus payments, government investments, or reform 
and restructuring of existing taxes. Over the longer term, as the economy 
adjusts, the revenues could be used for debt reduction. 
An alternative policy not proposed here but worth considering is phasing 
in the VAT, for example, starting at a 5 percent tax rate and then raising 
the rate one percentage point a year until it reaches 10 percent. A phase-in 
would raise the price of consumption gradually over time, giving people 
and businesses time to adjust their plans and incentives to accelerate 
consumption spending (to avoid higher tax rates in subsequent years). Th e 
increased consumption could provide direct stimulus to the economy, and 
the funds could also be used to stimulate the economy further (Gale 2019). 
If the VAT were to replace an equal-yield retail sales tax, the price level 
would be a nonissue. However, a VAT created in the absence of other policy 
changes would drive a wedge between wages and prices: either prices would 
go up or wages would go down (Gale 2005).
Monetary policy, presumably, will determine whether the adjustment 
occurs through nominal wages or prices. Congress should stipulate that the 
monetary authorities should accommodate the VAT and allow for a one-
time increase in the consumer price level (which includes the VAT) equal to 
the VAT rate. If instead, the Federal Reserve aims to keep consumer prices 
constant before and aft er the VAT is created, wages will (eventually) fall by 
the VAT rate, which would likely create signifi cant adjustment costs and 
job losses.30 
Implementing a one-time or gradual price level adjustment to accommodate 
the introduction of the VAT should not create continuing infl ation. Indeed, 
the presence of an additional revenue source would reduce the likelihood 
that the Federal Reserve will need to monetize defi cits.31
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LONG-TERM DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
As noted, the VAT is a combination of a non-distorting tax on (most) pre-
existing wealth and future supernormal returns (that is, returns above the 
normal rate prevailing in the economy) and a distortionary tax on labor 
income. As a result, the burden of the VAT will change over time, as the 
implicit tax on wealth is eventually paid off . I focus on the long-term 
distributional eff ects, essentially aft er the tax on wealth has been fully paid. 
In practice, it would take a long time to reach this situation, so the results 
should be thought of as bounding the long-term distributional eff ects. In 
the lengthy period before the wealth tax revenues are fully collected, the 
proposal will be more progressive than shown below, because taxes on pre-
existing wealth will continue to be paid and because pre-existing wealth is 
clearly distributed more unevenly than wages, which are much larger than 
supernormal profi ts. 
In the long term, aft er the initial period of adjustment, a consumption tax’s 
burden falls on wages and on supernormal returns to capital (that is, it 
exempts the normal return to capital). In contrast, an income tax falls on 
wages, the normal return, and supernormal returns. As a result, when the 
rate structure is held constant, a VAT is slightly less progressive than an 
income tax and more progressive than a payroll tax (Gentry and Hubbard 
1996). 
To bound the long-term distributional eff ects of the VAT, I follow Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center standard protocol. Households are classifi ed 
according to their annual expanded cash income.32 
Table 5 shows that the VAT without a UBI, with adjustments for Social 
Security benefi ts and means-tested transfers, is somewhat progressive. 
Aft er-tax income falls by 3.7 percent in the bottom quintile versus 6.1 
percent in the top quintile. Th e reason for the smaller decrease for low-
income households is that a large fraction—more than one-third—of their 
income is in the form of Social Security benefi ts or means-tested transfers 
and thus is protected from the VAT. Under this specifi cation, the bottom 
quintile pays about 3 percent of the overall tax, while the top quintile pays 
more than half of all VAT payments. Th e middle quintile bears signifi cant 
net tax burdens in this specifi cation: aft er-tax income falls by 5.3 percent.
Th e results become sharply more progressive in the presence of a UBI set 
at the VAT rate times the poverty level times two. In this case, the bottom 
quintile sees an increase in aft er-tax income of almost 17 percent, while 
the top quintile faces a reduction in aft er-tax income of 4.7 percent. Th e 
top quintile bears more than 100 percent of the tax—142 percent, to be 
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precise. With the UBI, the households in the middle quintile are essentially 
unaff ected on average—their aft er-tax income is virtually unchanged.33 
A lingering concern is that imposing a VAT would hurt low- or moderate-
income elderly households. In practice, however, to the extent that a VAT 
raises prices, low-income elderly households will not be aff ected very 
much. Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, the main sources of 
income for low- and moderate-income elderly households, are eff ectively 
indexed for infl ation. Social Security benefi ts for current retirees—which 
provide 90 percent of income for a third of the elderly, and more than half 
of all income for two-thirds of the elderly (Social Security Administration 
TABLE 5. 
Distribution of 10 percent VAT by Income Percentiles, 
with and without Universal Basic Income (UBI)
Expanded cash income percentilea,b
Percent change in 
after-tax incomec
Share of total 
federal tax changed
No UBI UBI No UBI UBI
Lowest quintile −3.7 16.9 2.9 −46.0
Second quintile −4.5 4.6 7.4 −26.0
Middle quintile −5.3 0.1 14.1 −0.8
Fourth quintile −5.9 −2.4 21.9 30.6
Top quintile −6.1 −4.7 53.3 142.6
Total −5.7 −1.7 100.0 100.0
80th–90th percentiles −6.3 −3.8 15.6 32.9
90th–95th percentiles −6.3 −4.5 10.6 26.3
95th–99th percentiles −6.2 −5.1 13.3 37.6
Top 1 percent −5.8 −5.5 13.8 45.8
Top 0.1 percent −5.4 −5.3 6.0 20.4
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0319-2).
a Includes both ﬁ ling and non-ﬁ ling units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units. Tax units 
with negative adjusted gross income are excluded from their respective income class but are included in the 
totals. For a description of expanded cash income, see Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (2019).
b The income percentile classes used in this table are based on the income distribution for the entire 
population and contain an equal number of people, not tax units. The breaks are as follows (in 2019 dollars, 
based on tax year 2020): 20%, $25,700; 40%, $51,300; 60%, $92,300; 80%, $167,000; 90%, $245,000; 
95%, $348,000; 99%, $828,000; and 99.9%, $3,708,100.
c After-tax income is expanded cash income less the following: individual income tax (net of refundable 
credits), corporate income tax, payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare), estate tax, and excise taxes.
d The sum shares ﬁ gures may not add to 100 percent because of rounding errors and other factors.
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2016)—would adjust with the consumer price level. Benefi ts for new retirees 
would be adjusted on a one-time basis, as described above, so that their 
infl ation-adjusted benefi ts remain unchanged under the proposal. Unlike 
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid cover specifi c services and would 
thus be unaff ected by the proposal. Finally, everyone would receive the UBI 
described above. Distributional results (not shown) indicate that both the 
VAT and the VAT with the UBI are progressive among elderly groups, and 
that the net burden imposed on elderly households by the VAT plus UBI is 
essentially zero. Th us, we can inoculate the low-income elderly from the 
burden of a consumption tax while increasing the burden on the high-
income elderly, who can more easily aff ord it. 
TAX ADMINISTRATION 
Designing, administering, and enforcing a VAT and issuing regulations 
would create new burdens for government. It would create new compliance 
costs for taxpayers as well, but they would likely be far smaller than those 
associated with the income tax, especially if the VAT has a broad base and 
taxes all items at the same rate (Bickley 2012). Firms already collect the 
information needed to fi le VAT (sales minus input purchases) in the normal 
operation of business. 
A VAT’s chain of crediting has administrative advantages over retail sales 
taxes because it creates a natural audit trail. Under the VAT, in a transaction 
between two businesses, the seller knows that the buyer is reporting the 
transaction to claim a credit, so the seller has more incentive to report the 
transaction and pay its tax. In contrast, a retail sales tax contains no similar 
incentive to report transactions.34 A retailer responsible for sending its 
collected sales tax revenue to the government knows that the government 
may not have a record of the transaction. Also, the retailer cannot always 
tell whether a buyer is a consumer who should pay the tax or a business 
that should not—and has little incentive to fi nd out. If the retailer does 
not impose a sales tax on consumer purchases, it commits tax evasion. 
If the retailer imposes a tax on business purchases, the tax “cascades,” 
building up over successive stages of production, raising and distorting 
prices, depending on the number of stages of production. Th e VAT avoids 
cascading by providing a credit for taxes paid. Lastly, when evasion occurs 
at the retail level, all tax revenue on the sale is lost under a retail sales tax, 
whereas under a VAT, only the tax on value added by the retailer is lost.35 As 
a result, most countries, states, and localities have found that retail sales tax 
rates of 10 percent or higher are not enforceable. All of this helps explain 
why so many countries have replaced their sales and turnover taxes with 
VATs (Tanzi 1995).36 
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VATs are still subject to avoidance and evasion, of course, but these 
opportunities are limited in a broad-based, single-rate tax. VAT (and sales 
tax) lore is full of colorful examples of tax avoidance created by zero rating 
and exemptions.37 Underpayment in a VAT can arise from many sources, 
including under-reported sales (although this is a bigger problem with a 
retail sales tax for the reasons noted), misclassifi cation of goods (when rates 
vary), tax collected but not remitted to the government, and false claims for 
VAT credits or refunds.38 
In European countries, where open borders are a top priority for non-tax 
reasons, a phenomenon called carousel fraud is a signifi cant problem. It 
occurs when a good is imported, then is sold domestically by a business that 
collects VAT and vanishes, and lastly is exported. Th e fraud exploits the fact 
that exports are zero rated and import taxes are not due immediately upon 
importation.39 Carousel fraud is most common with high-value goods sold 
across borders, such as cell phones and computer chips, and with intangible 
goods, such as carbon credits and cloud computing (European Parliament 
2018).40 
Th e adoption of a VAT in the United States would likely not see rampant 
carousel fraud. International trade is less important here: in 2016, imports 
and exports summed to 26 percent of GDP in the United States, compared 
with 84 percent of GDP on average for members of the European Union 
(OECD 2019). In addition, the United States does not prioritize having open 
borders the way the European Union does. Several proposed administrative 
solutions to carousel fraud could easily be adopted by the United States 
(e.g., making exports zero rated only aft er the tax has been collected on 
the import, or not allowing a good to clear customs until taxes have been 
paid).41 
Th e overall evasion rate for VATs appears to be lower than for income taxes 
but varies widely among countries. In 2017, unpaid tax liabilities were about 
11 percent of total VAT liability in the European Union, varying within 
member states from 0.6 percent in Cyprus to 35.5 percent in Romania 
(Center for Social and Economic Research 2019). Th e evasion rate would 
likely be signifi cantly lower under the proposed VAT in the United States 
both because of the broad-based, single-rate structure and because of the 
vastly lower prevalence of carousel fraud, which accounts for 29 to 44 
percent of all VAT evasion in the European Union (European Parliament 
2018). 
Finally, businesses under a VAT essentially serve as unpaid tax collectors 
(Robinson and Saviano 2011). Th ey could be compensated for these services 
with a small tax credit.
William Gale220
Questions and Concerns 
1. Will a VAT fuel growth of government? 
Some conservatives and libertarians fear that a VAT will fuel the growth 
of government. Anti-tax activist Grover Norquist says, “VAT is a French 
word for ‘big government’” (Cassidy 2005). According to Daniel Mitchell, 
a conservative tax commentator, giving policymakers a VAT would be like 
“giving keys to a liquor store to a bunch of alcoholics” (Mitchell 2010). 
Critics argue that the VAT is a “hidden tax” buried in the price of a good 
and that policymakers could raise the rate without public awareness. In 
fact, some evidence shows that policymakers can more easily raise rates 
on hidden taxes, and VATs have been “hidden” in some countries in the 
past (Finkelstein 2009). But they do not need to be hidden. American state 
sales taxes are reported visibly on receipts, and there has been no massive 
expansion of such taxes over the years. Policymakers should require that 
American VAT charges be reported clearly on receipts, as is the practice in 
Canada, France, and other countries currently. 
A related concern is that the creation of a VAT will raise revenues (the 
tax becomes a “money machine”), encouraging excessive government 
spending. Th e argument, essentially, is that the VAT is too effi  cient, raising 
revenue with such minimal economic distortion and administrative costs 
that it prompts the public to demand higher revenue and higher spending 
(Mitchell 2011). Conservative critics fear that such spending would 
be damaging and prefer that the process of taxing and spending be less 
effi  cient. 
Th e record largely belies concerns that VATs have fueled signifi cantly 
higher revenue levels. Although overall revenues have risen signifi cantly in 
European countries with VATs, VATs do not seem to be the main reason. 
For example, fi gure 2 shows that tax revenues in OECD countries have risen 
substantially over time from 24.9 percent of GDP in 1965 to 34 percent of 
GDP in 2016. But revenue as a share of GDP from all consumption taxes 
(including VATs, retail sales taxes, and excise taxes, among others) has 
risen by only 1.6 percentage points over the same period. So while VAT 
revenue as a share of GDP has risen by 6.1 percentage points, it has been 
largely off set by a 4.5 percentage point average decline in revenue as a share 
of GDP from other forms of consumption tax.42 
 In formal econometric analysis, Keen and Lockwood (2006, 925) fi nd that 
the “association between the presence of a VAT and total tax revenue is 
not simple, is not always statistically signifi cant . . . and may in any event 
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be small.” Th ey do not fi nd evidence that a VAT directly causes growth of 
government. Th ey point out that any eff ect of the VAT on total government 
spending has been diluted substantially by countries choosing to use VAT 
revenues to reduce other taxes. In addition, some evidence suggests that the 
causation runs the other way: the public’s demand for higher spending fuels 
demand for a VAT, an effi  cient revenue source (Lee, Kim, and Borcherding 
2013). Th us, the OECD countries’ experiences with a VAT do not suggest 
that the VAT causes sustained growth in government spending. 
Th e context for implementing a VAT in the United States—namely, that 
the long-term fi scal shortfall facing the country necessitates tax increases—
makes it even more unlikely that an American VAT would simply boost 
spending. 
To be fair, some evidence suggests that the more revenue the government 
has, the higher spending will be (Becker and Mulligan 2003). But U.S. 
history suggests that the opposite is more oft en the case. Every major tax 
cut of the past 60 years was accompanied or followed by an increase in 
spending, not a reduction.43 In contrast, the budget deals enacted in 1990 
and 1993 raised taxes and cut spending at the same time. So, in fact, U.S. 
policymakers tend to cut taxes and increase spending simultaneously; they 
also tend to raise taxes and cut spending simultaneously (Bartlett 2007; 
Gale and Orszag 2004; Romer and Romer 2009). Th us, when policymakers 
are ready to address the long-term fi scal challenge and create a VAT, they 
will likely couple it with spending cuts.
 FIGURE 2. 
OECD Tax Revenue as a Percent of GDP, 1965–2016
 Source: OECD Consumption Tax Trends 2018.
Note: Total consumption tax revenue is the sum of the VAT and “Other consumption tax rev-
enue”, which includes retail sales taxes, turnover taxes, and other taxes on goods and services. 
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2. How would a VAT aff ect the states?
A national VAT would have signifi cant implications for the sales taxes on 
which most states and many localities rely, but that is a feature, not a bug. 
Sales taxes are the second largest state and local revenue source. Some 
policymakers and experts view consumption taxes as the states’ prerogative 
and express concern that a national VAT would impinge on states’ ability 
to administer their own sales taxes. Th eir concerns are understandable, 
though states could retain their current retail sales taxes even in the 
presence of a federal VAT. But repealing their current sales taxes and 
replacing them with VATs that conform to a federal VAT base would off er 
many advantages for states. 
Currently, state sales taxes are poorly designed. McLure (2002, 841) refers 
to the “nutty” world of state sales taxes. Th e taxes exempt many goods and 
most services, which makes them unfair and ineffi  cient. Forty-fi ve states 
and DC have a sales tax; 34 of them exempt food consumed at home, and 
almost all exempt some component of health-care consumption. Business-
to-business transactions should also be exempt (to avoid tax cascading), 
but these transactions actually constitute around 40 percent of state sales 
tax revenues (Ring 1989; Phillips and Ibaid 2019; Gale 2005). State and 
local governments also have diffi  culty taxing out-of-state, mail-order, or 
internet purchases made by residents. States that impose their own VATs 
that conform to the federal VAT could solve these problems. Th ey could 
raise revenue with minimal economic distortion and vastly reduced 
administrative costs.44 
If the federal and state VAT bases were identical, the federal government 
could even collect revenue on behalf of the state, remit the funds to the 
state, and relieve the state of most VAT administrative costs altogether. 
At the least, states could piggyback on federal VAT administration as 
they currently do with the income tax, easing taxpayer compliance costs 
and government administrative costs.45 If states and localities adopt the 
federal VAT structure, they could replace existing sales tax revenues and 
protect the bottom 40 percent of households even more eff ectively than 
their current product exemptions do, with an average VAT rate of about 
6.6 percent and a UBI equal to the state VAT rate times the federal poverty 
line.46 Th e combined federal, state, and local average VAT rate, which would 
be 16.6 percent, would still be lower than the OECD average national rate 
of 19.3 percent. 
Th e experiences of the European Union member countries and Canada 
demonstrate that countries can successfully implement multilevel VATs 
(i.e., encompassing both the national and subnational tax authorities), 
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but the issue of interstate commerce merits further discussion. Without 
coordination among states, goods and services would have to be zero rated 
as an export every time they crossed a state border and then taxed as an 
import to the new state. Interstate commerce would be cumbersome and 
confusing. Keen (2001) highlights a simple solution to this problem: tax all 
business-to-business sales at the federal VAT and let states set their VAT on 
fi nal sales at whatever rate they would like. Th is solution would retain the 
character of the VAT as a sales tax, would eliminate the need to make state-
by-state border adjustments for business-to-business transactions, and 
would allow states to retain control over their own tax rates on fi nal sales. 
3. What are the political prospects for a VAT? 
Th e political obstacles to enacting a VAT in the United States are 
considerable. Policymakers mulled broad-based consumption taxes in the 
1930s to plug the budget, in the 1940s to fund World War II, in the 1970s 
to share revenues with states and localities, and in the 1980s and 1990s 
as part of overall tax reform—all to no avail. Th at makes the VAT, as one 
expert noted, “the most studied tax system that has never been seriously 
considered by Congress” (Schenk 2011).
Politicians have notoriously long memories, and, consequently, former 
Democratic House Ways and Means Committee chairman Al Ullman 
looms large. He proposed a VAT in 1979 and lost his reelection bid a year 
later. Many factors contributed to his loss—he was oft en away from his 
district, where his only residence was a hotel room, and 1980 was a big year 
for Republican candidates. His experience, though, has served as a warning 
to politicians who may be considering a VAT. So, too, does the experience 
of Canada’s Conservative Party, which was decimated in the election aft er 
it enacted a VAT.47
In that regard, it is somewhat remarkable that leading policymakers of both 
parties have proposed VATs in recent years. Conservatives may decry the 
VAT as an instrument of European socialism, but they have proposed VATs 
themselves, just under alternative names. Th ey speak of the VAT like the 
wizards in the Harry Potter stories speak of Voldemort—careful never to 
say the name. But the destination-based cash-fl ow tax that House Speaker 
Paul Ryan and Ways and Means Committee chair Kevin Brady proposed 
in the 2016 Republican “Better Way” blueprint is just a VAT with a wage 
deduction (Ryan and Brady 2016). VATs are embedded in Ryan’s “business 
consumption tax,” libertarian Kentucky senator Rand Paul’s “Fair and 
Flat Tax,” 2012 Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain’s “9-9-9” 
proposal, and Republican senator Ted Cruz’s “Business Flat Tax” (Ryan 
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2008; Paul 2015; Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 2011; Cruz Campaign 
2015).
VATs have also been proposed (and renamed) in Senate Finance Committee 
Democrat Ben Cardin’s “progressive consumption tax” and the Bipartisan 
Policy Center’s 2010 Domenici-Rivlin commission report, which called it 
a “defi cit reduction sales tax” (Cardin 2015; Debt Reduction Task Force 
2010). Although these leading policymakers proposed to use the resulting 
revenues diff erently, they all viewed the VAT favorably for three reasons: it 
raises lots of money, it creates few negative economic incentives, and it is 
administratively sound. 
Th e Taxpayer Protection Pledge, also known as the “no new taxes” pledge, 
will be a signifi cant obstacle to enacting a VAT (or any other tax) that raises 
net revenue. Created by the lobbying group Americans for Tax Reform, 
which is headed by Grover Norquist, the pledge has been signed by 88 
percent of Republicans in the 116th Congress (2019–21), including almost 
all of the party’s leaders (Americans for Tax Reform 2019). No Democrats 
have signed on, and only one independent has. But in some situations, the 
country needs to raise taxes. World Wars I and II come immediately to 
mind. Even Ronald Reagan saw fi t to raise taxes on numerous occasions 
(Bartlett 2011). Th e pledge has been criticized by both the right and the left , 
is unpopular with voters, and makes negotiations about reaching a fi scal 
solution almost impossible: if one side will not consider tax increases, why 
should the other side consider spending cuts (Gale 2019)? 
4. What can we learn from Canada’s experience? 
Th e VAT operates in 168 countries and raises an average of almost 20 
percent of all revenue in OECD member countries, suggesting that many 
countries fi nd the VAT to be a useful tool. But sometimes a simple example 
can speak as compellingly as reams of data. For example, we can assuage 
concerns about regressivity, government growth, transparency, and state-
level impacts by focusing attention on Canada’s VAT (Sullivan 2011). 
In 1991, Canada implemented a 7 percent national VAT to replace a tax on 
sales by manufacturers. It was introduced by the Conservative Party, which 
sought to address concerns about competitiveness and the government’s 
fi scal situation. To address distributional concerns, Canada applied a zero 
rate to certain necessities (e.g., groceries, medicines, and rent), and added 
a refundable credit to the income tax for lower-income people. Transfer 
payments were already indexed for infl ation and highly progressive, which 
further off set the VAT’s regressivity. As noted, Canada’s VAT is completely 
transparent: it is listed separately on receipts and invoices, just like state 
and local sales taxes in the United States.
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At least in Canada, fears about a VAT have proved unfounded:
• It did not decimate provincial consumption taxes; some provinces 
have converted their sales taxes to the VAT base, while others have not. 
Provinces set their own VAT rates, which either they or the Canadian 
government can administer. Of Canada’s 13 provinces and territories, 
nine have a provincial sales tax—four administered in addition to the 
Canadian Goods and Sales Tax (GST) and fi ve harmonized to the GST 
(Sullivan 2011). 
• Th e rate has not risen inexorably; it has actually fallen over time. 
Policymakers cut the standard VAT rate to 6 percent in 2006 and then 
to 5 percent in 2008 (Sullivan 2011). 
• It has not fueled government spending; Canada’s general government 
tax revenue and spending have generally fallen as a share of its economy 
since 1991 (OECD 2017).
Th e political concerns are partially valid; the Conservative Party took 
a beating in the election following the creation of a VAT. But the Liberal 
Party, which had promised to repeal the VAT, did not do so upon taking the 
reins of power, and the VAT has survived (Sullivan 2011). 
Conclusion 
Th e VAT has a lot to off er to policymakers and the American public. Th e 
tax can raise revenue in a relatively effi  cient, relatively progressive, and 
administrable manner. Given the long-term fi scal shortfalls facing the 
country and the need for more government investment in crucial social 
priorities, it seems to be only a matter of time until policymakers will be 
forced to consider a VAT more seriously than in the past. 
Appendix. Alternative Forms of Consumption 
Taxation 
Consumption taxes come in many forms. At a high level of abstraction, the 
taxes are clearly related (and indeed equivalent in some respects). 
For example, in the credit-invoice VAT (sometimes called a goods and 
services tax), each business pays the government the VAT collected on its 
sales minus a credit for the VAT it pays on input purchases (as shown in table 
1 earlier). Th e credit-invoice VAT can be thought of as similar to a retail 
sales tax, with revenue collected at each stage of production rather than 
in one fell swoop at the retail level. Th is comparison only holds, though, if 
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the VAT has two additional features. First, it must allow a full deduction 
for new investment in the year it was made (“expensing”). Second, it must 
provide border adjustments. Almost all real-world VATs possess these two 
features, which make a VAT a destination-based consumption tax, like the 
retail sales tax. 
Recall that a business’s “value added” is the diff erence between its gross sales 
and its purchase of goods and services from other businesses. It is equal to 
cash fl ow plus total compensation to workers (for simplicity, wages), or 
 (1) Value added = Sales − Purchases 
     = (Sales − Purchases − Wages) + Wages 
 (2)   = Cash fl ow + Wages 
Under the subtraction-method VAT (sometimes called a business transfer 
tax), an alternative way to tax value added, businesses pay VAT on the 
aggregate diff erence between their sales to businesses and consumers, 
and their purchases from businesses, as shown in equation 1. Under many 
conditions, the subtraction-method VAT gives the same outcomes as a 
credit-invoice VAT. 
Hall and Rabushka (1985) developed the “fl at tax” based on the subtraction-
method VAT. A fl at tax divides the base into two parts. Businesses pay 
taxes on their cash fl ow. People pay taxes on their wages at a fl at rate with 
personal exemptions (see equation 2). Th e X-tax (Bradford 1986) is similar 
to a fl at tax but imposes graduated rates on wages and sets the business tax 
rate equal to the top tax rate on wages.
Neither the fl at tax nor the X-tax contain border adjustments. As a 
result, they would tax goods produced in the United States rather than 
goods consumed in the United States (see fi gure 1 and appendix table 1). 
Representatives Paul Ryan and Kevin Brady (2016) proposed a destination-
based cash-fl ow tax that is just a VAT with a wage deduction (appendix 
table 1). It would tax the same business cash-fl ow base as the fl at tax and 
X-tax and would also implement border adjustments. 
Th e business taxes described above are not so diff erent from the existing 
corporate tax. If one starts with the fl at tax or X-tax business tax structure, 
the current corporate tax is largely recouped by allowing fi rms to take 
deductions for interest payments and by requiring fi rms to depreciate 
rather than expense their investments in structures (appendix table 1). 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. 
Comparison of Tax Bases
  Business base
Individual 
base
Border 
adjustment
Subtraction-method VAT
Cash ﬂ ow + 
wages
— Yes
Flat tax Cash ﬂ ow
Wages (with 
exemption)
No
X-tax Cash ﬂ ow
Wages 
(graduated 
rates with 
exemption)
No
Destination-based cash ﬂ ow 
tax
Cash ﬂ ow — Yes
Current corporate rate Proﬁ tsa — No
a Proﬁ ts = cash ﬂ ow + investment − depreciation − net interest 
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Endnotes
1.  Th is paper is adapted from a chapter in Fiscal Th erapy: Curing America’s Debt Addiction and Investing 
in the Future (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
2.  As discussed in the appendix, the equivalence between a VAT and a retail sales tax requires a few 
additional conditions, namely that the VAT expenses current investment and provides border tax 
adjustments. In practice, virtually all VATs in existence satisfy these requirements. 
3.  See Batchelder and Kamin (2019), Gale (2019), and Saez and Zucman (2019a, 2019b) for further 
discussion of taxing the rich. 
4.  Th ese payments would not be considered in determining eligibility for federal, state, or local 
government means-tested programs.  
5.  All references to VAT data from OECD countries are from OECD (2016, 2017, 2018) and are 
weighted by GDP, unless otherwise noted.  
6.  OECD (2019) defi nes social security contributions as “compulsory payments paid to general 
government that confer entitlement to receive a (contingent) future social benefi t. Th ey include 
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unemployment insurance benefi ts and supplements, accident, injury and sickness benefi ts, old-
age, disability and survivors’ pensions, family allowances, reimbursements for medical and hospital 
expenses or provision of hospital or medical services. Contributions may be levied on both 
employees and employers. Such payments are usually earmarked to fi nance social benefi ts and are 
oft en paid to those institutions of general government that provide such benefi ts.” 
7.  Th e proposed tax rates are equivalent to a markup at the cash register, in the same way that retail 
sales taxes are typically quoted. In technical terms, the proposed VAT rate is a tax-exclusive rate 
(Gale 2005). 
8.  If the price level, including the VAT, did not rise, equity holders would bear the full burden of the 
wealth tax. Holders of nominal debt would not see any change in the value of their assets. 
9.  Keen (2001, 198) notes that both the liberal and conservative views “are probably wrong.”  
10.  Th e current policy outcome adjusts CBO’s current law projections to show the eff ects of alternative 
policies. Major temporary provisions in the tax code are assumed to be permanent, and delayed 
provisions are assumed to be permanently delayed (i.e., eliminated). Th e current policy adjustments 
also allow nondefense discretionary spending, already indexed to increase with infl ation, to grow 
with population as well.  
11.  Th is is meant to represent a tax-exclusive tax rate. Th at is, the VAT would be 10 percent of the price 
not including the tax. For example, if the good sold for $100 before the VAT is applied, a 10 percent 
tax-exclusive VAT would result in a levy of $10. Any tax can be represented with a tax-exclusive or 
a tax-inclusive rate. For example, if the good sold for $100 pre-VAT, a $10 tax would represent a 
tax-inclusive rate of 9.1 percent (10 divided by 110).  
12.  Th e prices given in this example assume that consumers bear the full incidence of the tax. 
13.  In 2016, 78 percent of children from the top income quartile enrolled in college, compared with 46 
percent of children from the bottom income quartile (Cahalan et al. 2018).  
14.  One option is to tax fi nancial fi rms on a cash-fl ow basis. Th e International Monetary Fund has 
proposed a fi nancial activities tax that is essentially a tax on the sum of worker compensation and 
profi ts in the fi nancial sector, which is another way to calculate value added (see Keen, Krelove, and 
Norregaard 2016). Merrill (2011) advocates a tax calculation system that determines VAT liability 
on an account-by-account basis. Another option is the mobile-ratio approach, which allocates the 
fi nancial margin of a fi rm to each fi nancial transaction and hence taxes almost all value added by 
the fi nancial sector (López-Laborda and Peña 2018).  
15.  See Gendron (2011) for further discussion.  
16.  Border adjustment implies that the wealth tax imposed by the VAT is absorbed by Americans. 
Without border adjustment, foreign wealth holders bear some of the burden of that levy because 
U.S. exports would include the tax. But, such a process would also make U.S. exports more expensive 
and possibly harm exporting fi rms and workers. 
17.  Taxing everything at the same rate is not always the optimal choice in theory. Under certain 
assumptions, the Ramsey rule implies that inelastically demanded goods should be taxed at higher 
rates. Under diff erent circumstances, optimal commodity taxes should be higher for goods that are 
complements to leisure, which is untaxed. See Corlett and Hague (1953).  
18.  State sales taxes in the United States also provide product exemptions rather than per-household 
payments.  
19.  Th e table does not include the eff ects of higher federal government spending or revenues due to 
the tax the federal government owes to itself. Nor does the table include receipts from state and 
local government wages and purchases or the rebates those governments would receive from the 
federal government. All these eff ects, taken together, would not change the impact of the VAT on 
the defi cit.  
20.  Th ese fi gures assume that the monetary authorities accommodate the VAT and let prices rise by the 
full extent of the VAT (i.e., by 10 percent). If the consumer price level rises by less than the full extent 
of the VAT, some of the eff ect would involve lower government spending and a revenue decrease via 
lower revenues from other taxes. In contrast, when prices rise by the full extent of the VAT, there 
is no off setting response in the form of lower revenues from other taxes (see Toder, Nunns, and 
Rosenberg 2011). In a fi rst-order approximation abstracting from the impact of diff erent price level 
patterns on the economy, the eff ect on the federal budget defi cit and debt would be the same under 
any aggregate price level adjustment. Th e assumption that the nominal price level will rise diff ers 
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from the standard assumption in distributional analyses (of income tax changes) undertaken by 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, CBO, and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center that nominal 
prices stay fi xed. But it makes more sense in the context of a VAT, since the alternative is that 
nominal wages have to fall, a process that could trigger an economic downturn.  
21.  Th e return to capital can be decomposed into a “normal” return (that is, the return on waiting) and 
excess or “supernormal” returns, which can consist of the returns on risk, skill, monopoly power, 
etc. A consumption tax does not burden the normal return because waiting to consume does not 
aff ect the present value of consumption. Some households may also fi nance consumption out of 
public or private transfers, but those transfers ultimately stem from one of the three sources listed 
in the text.  
22.  Th is does not require that the wealth be eventually consumed. It just requires that some of the 
income from the wealth be consumed (i.e., that wealth ultimately grows more slowly than the 
interest rate). See Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1987) and Auerbach (2006). 
23.  An alternative viewpoint rejects the one-time implicit wealth tax and argues instead that “deliberate 
attempts to impose such unexpected taxes are inappropriate” and “pernicious” (Carroll and Viard 
2012, 126–27) See Carroll and Viard (2012) and Kaplow (2008) for a more detailed exposition. 
One reason a tax on existing wealth is considered inappropriate is the concern that it could be 
repeated. In this regard, imposing a one-time wealth tax through a consumption tax (rather than, 
say, through an explicit wealth levy) off ers some reassurance, since the consumption tax can only be 
imposed once (though the tax rate could be raised).  
24.  Altig et al. (2001) show that, even in the long term, more than 60 percent of the growth eff ect of 
substituting a VAT for the income tax is due to the lump-sum tax on existing wealth.  
25.  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center calculation. 
26.  If the general equilibrium eff ects of the wealth tax are considered, some of the eff ects of a direct 
wealth tax are likely to be borne by households below the top 0.1 percent. A lower capital stock 
would reduce wages, but a reduced amount of rent-seeking on the part of executives and fi rms 
could raise wages. For further discussion, see Penn Wharton Budget Model (2019). 
27.  Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center calculation using data from the 2016 Survey of Consumer 
Finances aged to 2019 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 2016). 
28.  Understanding the avoidance, evasion, administrative, and revenue eff ects from Warren’s wealth 
tax is a work in progress. No such tax or anything similar to it has ever been imposed in the United 
States. A study by the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates that Warren’s proposal would raise 
$2.7 trillion, nearly 30 percent less than the campaign’s claims. Accounting for macroeconomic 
eff ects, the Warren wealth tax would bring in $2.3 trillion (Penn Wharton Budget Model 2019). 
Some commentators deemed the revenue estimates from a previous version of Warren’s wealth tax 
to be overly optimistic (see Holtzblatt 2019 and Summers and Sarin 2019). See also Rubin (2019). 
29.  See Gale and Samwick (2016) for a more extensive discussion of the relationship between taxes and 
long-term growth. 
30.  Downward nominal wage rigidity can lead to increased employment losses from a negative labor 
demand shock relative to the losses that would be expected if nominal wages were fully fl exible 
(Devereux and Altonji 2000; Elsby and Solon 2019).  
31.  Gale and Harris (2013) note that “research has found only a weak relationship between the VAT 
and continually increasing prices. In a survey of thirty-fi ve countries that introduced the VAT, Tait 
(1991) fi nds that 63 percent exhibited no increase in the consumer price index (perhaps because 
they were replacing existing sales taxes) and that 20 percent had a one-time price rise. In the 
remaining 17 percent of cases, the introduction of the VAT coincided with ongoing acceleration in 
consumer prices, but in Tait’s view, it is not likely that the VAT caused the acceleration.”  
32.  Expanded cash income is a broad income measure equal to adjusted gross income plus (1) above-
the-line adjustments, (2) employee contributions to tax-preferred retirement accounts, (3) tax-
exempt interest, (4) nontaxable Social Security and pension income, (5) cash transfers, (6) the 
employer share of payroll taxes, (7) imputed corporate tax liability, (8) tax-exempt employee and 
employer contributions to health insurance and other fringe benefi ts, (9) employer contributions 
to tax-preferred retirement accounts, (10) income earned within retirement accounts, and (11) 
nutrition benefi ts (food stamps). For further background and explanation, see Urban-Brookings 
Tax Policy Center (2019). 
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33.  Th e distributional consequences and characterization of the VAT depend on how taxpayers are 
classifi ed (consumption or income) and how the tax is allocated—either to sources of income 
(wages and capital) or uses of income (consumption). Th e results discussed in this chapter represent 
a middle ground between alternative ways to estimate the distributional eff ects. For example, if 
households were classifi ed by annual income, as they are here, but the tax were allocated on the 
basis of household consumption (rather than according to wages and supernormal returns on 
capital), the VAT (without UBI) appears to be very regressive in the long-run steady state. Because 
the VAT is a proportional tax on consumption, and because lower-income households consume 
greater shares of their income than do high-income households, the tax burden is a larger share 
of income for lower-income households than for high-income households (Burman, Gravelle, and 
Rohaly 2005; Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba 1997). Alternatively, if households were classifi ed by 
annual consumption and the tax were allocated on the basis of household consumption, the tax is 
proportional across income groups in the long-run steady state. Likewise, to the extent that current 
consumption refl ects average lifetime income, the VAT is also proportional with respect to lifetime 
income (Casperson and Metcalf 1994; Metcalf 1994).  
34.  See Cnossen (2011) and Pomeranz (2015) for discussion of these incentives under a VAT. In the 
income tax, businesses withhold income and payroll taxes on behalf of workers and send the money 
to the government. As a result, evasion rates for wage income are quite low (Gale and Holtzblatt 
2002). Naritomi (2019) discusses ways to incentivize consumers to report retail sales to the 
government, which then can use the reports to check whether fi rms are paying taxes appropriately. 
35.  A national retail sales tax has other problems (Gale 2005; President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform 2005). Advocates have argued that a 23 percent national sales tax rate would be suffi  cient to 
replace virtually all federal taxes, but the calculation is fl awed, and the actual rate would need to be 
much higher to maintain real government spending and revenues. 
36.  VATs do have some administrative problems of their own. While tax evasion is typically lower under 
a VAT than under an income tax, it is not always low; one study estimated a 40 percent evasion rate 
in the Italian VAT (Tanzi 1995). Informal sectors of the economy, such as tip income or babysitting, 
will escape a VAT as well as income or sales taxes. Taxing certain sectors, like fi nancial services, 
has proven diffi  cult under a VAT because it is hard to identify the value added. New types of fraud, 
involving businesses that collect the VAT on their sales and then disappear with the proceeds, have 
emerged in recent years in Europe. 
37.  A famous case in Britain in the 1990s revolved around whether Jaff a Cakes were actually cakes 
or biscuits (cookies), which were taxed at diff erent rates. More recently in the United Kingdom, 
the taxation of nuts has become an issue. Nuts are zero rated unless they are roasted, salted, and 
removed from the shell, in which case they are subject to 20 percent VAT. Th e rule for peanuts is 
slightly diff erent: they are zero rated if they are removed from the shell but not roasted or salted. 
Further complications arise in nut mixtures. A recent court ruling regarding a dark chocolate bar, 
which could have been treated as a confectionary (taxed) or a baking ingredient (zero rated) hinged 
in part on the aisle in which the good was placed in supermarkets. Th ese types of rules are recipes 
for disaster in tax administration. In the United States, diff erences in sales taxes on pumpkins, 
depending on their use, and on candies, depending on their ingredients, have attracted attention in 
recent years. See Kaeding (2019). States’ policies for taxing doughnuts highlight the complexity of 
sales taxes: North Carolina and Washington tax doughnuts sold with eating utensils, and New York 
and Wyoming tax doughnuts on the basis of the quantity sold. See Erb (2019). 
38.  Missing trader intra-community fraud, a prevalent form of VAT fraud in the European Union, 
occurs when a business imports a good, sells it domestically, collects VAT on the sale, and simply 
never remits it to the government. Th e business disappears or closes, becoming a “missing trader.” In 
this type of fraud, criminal organizations take advantage of the lag between when VAT is collected 
(during a sale) and when the tax must be remitted to the government (in periodic tax returns). 
39.  A simple description of carousel fraud, based on Keen and Smith (2006), is as follows: (1) Firm A, 
in country 1, sells a widget to company B in country 2 for $100. Company A appropriately receives a 
full refund from country 1 of any input VAT it paid. (2) Firm B is not required to pay VAT to country 
2 until its next periodic return. Let the VAT rate in country 2 be 10 percent. Firm B sells the widget 
for $110 (including VAT) to fi rm C, also in country 2, showing $10 as VAT. Firm B does not remit 
the tax to the authorities. Instead, it disappears before its next periodic return is due, and simply 
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keeps the money (this is where the “missing trader” terminology comes from). (3) Meanwhile, the 
invoice issued to fi rm C entitles it to a $10 credit. Firm C sells the widget back to company A in 
country 1 (the return feature is where the “carousel” terminology comes from) for $100. Because 
exports are zero rated, fi rm C gets a full rebate of its $10 in VAT payments. (4) Th e cycle starts over. 
For each cycle, the loss to the government of country 2 is $10. Th ere is no value added in country 2, 
so there should be no net revenue. Th e government should have received $10 from fi rm B and then 
refunded that amount to fi rm C. Instead, the government pays the $10 to fi rm C but never collects 
the money from fi rm B. In practice, of course, the schemes can be much more complex, involving 
multiple layers of companies (not all in on the scam) located in diff erent countries.  
40.  Indeed, at one point, a single person appeared to account for 10 percent of worldwide sales of one 
type of computer chip. In fact, however, he had only a single box that was rapidly making round 
trips across the Ireland–UK border (Ainsworth 2006). 
41.  See the discussion in Keen and Smith (2006).  
42.  Among 16 Western European countries from 1965 to 2015, VAT revenue rose by 5.6 percent of 
GDP, but excise and other sales taxes off set almost all of that change, falling by 5.2 percent of GDP. 
Indeed, in many instances, policymakers in those countries enacted a VAT with the explicit goal of 
replacing less effi  cient sales and other taxes. Total revenue in those 16 countries rose substantially 
over time—by about 10 percent of GDP—but the VAT increase in excess of other consumption 
tax reductions (0.4 percent of GDP) was only a tiny fraction of the total tax increase. Th ese fi gures 
update calculations in Sullivan (2012), using data from OECD (2017). All 16 countries are included 
in the analysis, regardless of whether they had a VAT in 1965. 
43.  Major cuts were passed in 1964, 1981, 2001, 2003, 2009, and 2017. 
44.  In light of South Dakota v. Wayfair, states have the authority to collect sales taxes on transactions 
in which the seller does not have a physical presence in that state, also known as “nexus” (Supreme 
Court of the United States 2018). If there were a national VAT, states that aligned their own VAT 
base with the national VAT base would be able to more easily collect tax on sales within their states 
by businesses that had no nexus. 
45.  Of course, a federal VAT would also have direct eff ects on states if it were to tax purchases by state 
governments. Nunns and Toder (2015) show, however, that if the federal VAT exempts state and 
local government spending, as proposed, the eff ects on state budgets would be either neutral or 
positive. 
46.  With a UBI equal to the poverty line times the VAT rate, the bottom quintile would receive a net 
increase in aft er-tax income, and the second quintile would face a net burden of zero (Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center calculation). Under even the most progressive current state or local 
sales tax, those two groups would face positive eff ective tax rates. Th e 6.6 percent rate is calculated 
by setting the $414 billion in state and local sales tax revenue in 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau 2019) 
equal to gross revenues from the VAT (the $9,796 billion base times the tax rate) less the cost of the 
UBI (the tax rate times $2,975 billion, the cost of the poverty level summed over all tax units). Note 
that a state VAT that substitutes for existing sales taxes would not aff ect the price level or other tax 
burdens.  
47.  In 2010, the U.S. Senate went out of its way to disparage the VAT, voting 85–13 to support the 
statement “Th e Value Added Tax is a massive tax increase that will cripple families on fi xed income 
and only further push back America’s economic recovery.” Such “sense of the Senate” resolutions, 
however, are not binding. For example, in 1981 a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate 
against taxing Social Security benefi ts passed 98–0. Under the provisions of the Social Security 
reforms passed two years later, Congress started taxing Social Security benefi ts (see Avi-Yonah 2011 
and Carroll and Viard 2012). 
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